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Since 1981 President Reagan has requested increasing amounts of military 
and economic a?d to assist two embattled Salvadoran governments in  he 
struggle against leftist guerrillas. While Congress has generally supported 
rhe Administration's requests for economic aid, it has regularly cut military 
assistance to El Salvador and has made the aid contingent upon a semi-annual 
Presidential certification that human rights are improving in the country.. 
This year President Reagan proposed a $ 6 C   i ill ion reprogramning of FY83 
militaryaid for the country and also requested $50 million in FY63 
supplemental military assisrance for El Salvador. For FY84 he requested 
$86.3 million in military aid for the country. (See chart at end of paper 
for details. ) 
Administration supporters stress the need to support the interim Magana 
government in order to prevent the coming to power fo a communist-style 
government that would pose a security threat to the region. Critics, fearing 
that the United States might be drawn into a Vietnam-type quagmire in support 
of an unpopular regime, argue that the United States should seek a political 
solution to the conflict through negotiations without placing undue emphasis 
upon military means. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
The Background and Policy Analysis section of this issue brief is 
organizes in the following'manner: 
Congressional Options 
1. Terminate Military Aid to El Salvador 
2. Increase Pressure on the Salvadoran Government 
by Tightening the Requirements of the Aid Conditions 
3. Modify the Conditions to Require the Salvadoran 
Government to Negotiate with the RDR-FMLN 
4. Strengthen the Congressional Role by Adding a 
Legislative Veto to the Conditions 
5. Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran 
Government 
Congressional action in 1983 
Appended to this issue brief are a table (U.S. Economic and Military 
Assistance to El Salvador: FY79-FY84) and a map of El Salvador. 
BACKGROUND 
Congress is now reassessing U.S. policy toward the current Salvadoran 
government in light of more than .two years of active U.S. support for 
civilian-military juntas in El Salvador against leftist guerrillas. 
When junior military officers overthrew the government of General Carlos 
Humberto Romero in October 1979 and set up a civilian-military junta that 
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promised fundamental reforms, the Carter Ad~~inistration welcomed the change. 
The Romero government was viewed as a continuation of the military-elite 
alliance that had controlled Salvadoran politics for more than 30 years, 
partly by repressing emerging opposition forces and partly by manipulating 
the results cf the 1972' and 1977 elections to prevent a victory by a 
coalition of parties dominated by Christian Democrats asserting a need for 
reforms. 
in early 1960, followihg the collapse of the first junta, the military 
made a pact with the Christian Democratic Party and shortly thereafter the 
resulting civilian-military junta launched extensive reforms, including a 
land reform and a banking reform. Sy Karch of 1980, however, important 
civilian elements, including the social democratic National Revolutionary 
Kovement (Mh 'R)  and the left wing of the Christian Democratic Party, had 
resigned from the g o v e r n m e ~ t ,  charging that  he junta was unable co control 
security force repression. h short time later, these moderate left groups 
joined forces with the militant left "popular organizations" of workers, 
peasants, and students to create the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). 
The FDR then join.ed with the Farabundo Marti Rational Liberation Front (FMLN) 
guerrillas in the effort to topple the U.S.-supported junta headed, in late 
1980, by Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte. 
The Carter Administration suspended aid to El Salvador in December 1980, 
fcllowing the murder of four American nuns near San Salvador. It resumed and 
increased aid in mid-January 1981, when the FMLN guerrillas launched a 
S0-~alle8 "final offensive" that seemed to threater: the collapse of the 
Salvadoran government. The Reagan Administration subsequently increased 
military and economic aid to the Duarte-led junta and sent about 50 ' U.S. 
military advisers to train the Salvadoran armed forces in counter-insurgency 
methods. While the guerrilla's heraldee "final Offensive" failed, renewed 
attacks.on bridges,-.the electrical system, a.nd the. 1'1,lopango air base 
demonstrated their continuing capability These successes prompted the Reagan 
Admipistratior, to provi'de $55 million in emergency military aid in early 
1962. 
By the summer of 1981, the FDR-FKLN, with support from Mexico and France, 
called for a negotiated political settlement to the conflict. The Duarte 
government rejected negotiations, and, instead, at U.S. urging, called cn 
all duly constituted parties to participate in junta-held elections in March 
1982 for a constituent assembly that would form a temporary government, write 
a new Constitution, and establish ground rules for future elections. 
While leftwing groups refused to participate and sought to disrupt the 
elections, a massive turnout of nearly 1.5 million voters cast ballots on 
March 28, 1982. In these elections, a coalition of rightwing parties jointly 
won 60% of the vote to insure control of the Constituent Asembly. The 
Christian Democratic Party (PDC), running on a campaign of continuation of 
the junta's reforms, emerged as the single largest party, with over 40% of 
the vote, but seemed likely to be excluded from a meaningful role in the 
provisional government. 
After weeks of delicate discussions, the Constitutent Assembly elected 
Alvaro Alfredo Magana, a political centrist supported by the Salvadoran 
military, as the interim President of the Government of National Unity which 
included PDC participation. Three vice presidents representing the major 
political parties were also elected. 
After weeks of negotiations the parties represented in the Government of 
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Natiorial Unity signed a basic program of action called the Pact of Apaneca in 
August 1962. This called for the creation of three c~mmissions: (1) a 
Political Commission to set the rcles for definitive national elections, (2) 
a Human Rights Commission to monitor human rights performance, and (3) a 
Peace Comrr,ission to promote peace in the country, possibly throu.gh talks with 
the Salvadoran guerrillas. Simultaneously, the newly elected Constitutent 
Assembly was to complete action on a new constitution. 
By the end of 1983 the Magana-led government was receiving mixed reviews. 
The Political Commission, after announcing elections for December 1983, was 
forced to postpone its plans when the Constituent Assembly fell behind 
schedule. Instead, in late November the government announced that new 
elections would be held in March 1984. With the establishment of the Human 
Rights Commission in October 1982, the human rights conditions in the country 
initially experienced some improvement. Civilian deaths attributed to 
political violence declined significantly, while disappearances continued at 
about the same rate as previous years. Toward the end of 1983, however, 
there Was a resurgence of right-wing death squad activity which was publicly 
denounced by U.S. Ambassador Pickering in a speech on Nov. 25, 1983. After 
President Reagan pocket-vetoed a bill to extend the congressionally mandated 
human rights conditions on aid to El Salvador on Nov. 30, Secretary of State 
Shultz was quoted as saying that it would have been "very difficult" to make 
the required certification in January 1984. 
In the first half of 1983 the Salvadoran military appeared to gain the 
initiative in the struggle with the guerrillas. The number of U.S.-trained 
battalions increased and the Salvadoran Army launched the so-called National 
Strategy Plan in San Vicente province. Through a combination of military 
mobility and civil action projects this was to expand government control in 
guerrilla strongholds yhile the Peace Commission sought to encourage the 
guerrillas to participate in 'upcoming' elections. while peace' Commission - '  
members met with guerrillas representatives on several occcsions, at times 
facilitated by Central American Envoy Richard Stone, the parties were unable 
to come to terms. Guerrilla leaders insisted on the creation of a broad 
coalition government prior to participation in democratic elections, while 
the Peace Commission was unwilling to discuss anything other than leftist 
participation in government-held elections. By'the end of the year, the 
guerrillas had shown surprising resiliency, including an ability to conduct 
significant offensive operations, and the Army was said to be unable to 
maintain the initiative. 
The Constitution Assembly continued to make progress on completion of a 
new constitution, but was unable to agree on several articles, particularly 
those dealing with the agrarian reform. While the Christian Democrats argued 
that a Continuation of the reform with payment in bonds was crucial to 
undercut the guerrillas appeals,. more conservative parties urged that 
expropriation be undertaken only on the basis of prior and complete 
Compensation. The lack of consensus on this issue was one indication of the 
lack of unity within the government that would be resolved only after the 
1984 elections. 
Congressional Options 
A variety of options is available to Congress in its consideration of the 
Administration's request for FY84 aid. All of the options, however, involve 
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risks and ~n one way or another r e q u ~ r e  trade-offs among widely acceFteC 
C.S. o b ~ e c t ~ v e s .  For  he sake of C ~ s ~ u s s ~ o r , ,  tne options are grouped lntc 
flve broaC categories. 
Terminate Military Aid to El Salvador 
During the 97th Congress, a sizable number of Members supported 
res0lUtions introdu.ced by Representative Studds and Senator Kennedy to 
prohibit military aid and arms sales to El Salvador. They argued that a 
regime that had permitted 30,000 of its citizens to be killed in 
indiSCriminate violence and that %as taken icadequate action in the highly 
publicized cases of the murders of U.S. citizens did not deserve U.S. 
support. They argued that military aid has only increased the killing anC 
repression in the country and has strengthened the role of the military in 
the society. Believing that many cf the guerrillas' arms are captured, they 
contended that a cut in U.S. military aid may lead to a reduction in the 
violence in the country. Without open-ended support from the United States, 
:hey argued, the Salvadoran government would be forced to deai more 
realistically with some of the guerrilla's demands and to implement changes 
in order to prevent a guerrilla victory. 
Those who now support the terminatior~ of military aid by the 98th Congress 
argue that U.S. efforts to encourage reform have been inadequate, precisely 
because powerful Salvadoran elites are convinced the United States wili not 
terminate assistanc-e. Supporters of this option tend to feel that a 
termination of U.S. aid would encourage negotiations betweeR the government 
and the guerrillas. They foresee a resulting left-of-center coalition 
government that would exclude the more extreme elements of the far left and 
the far right. They are inclined to believe chat the political aims cf the 
'Democratic Revolutionary Front, which inclu'des social d'emocrats, clissident 
Christian Democrats, and independents can successfully be moderated by a more 
zccommodating U.S. policy. They reject arguments that the Harch 1982 
elections demonstrated the weakness of the moderate lefz since they feel that 
the leftist parties had legitimate reasons to doubt the safety and 
effectiveness of their participation. 
Opponents of a terminatioc of U.S. aid argue that such action would 
undermine the legitimacy and the defense capability of the Salvadoran 
government and lead to a victory by externally-supported Marxist guerrillas, 
many of whom are dedicated to totalitarian control of society. They cite 
numerous historical examples, and especially the Cuban and Nicaraguan cases, 
in support of their contention that extreme leftists who are hostile to the 
United States will wrest effective control fron more moderace elements if the 
opposition movement came to power. They argue that a termination of American 
assistance would undermine the growing authority of the central government 
and lead to a significant increase in the level of violence in the country. 
Without U.S. leverage, they argue that those like President Magana and 
Defense Minister Garcia who have supported the U.S.-sponsored reforms might 
be weakened to the point where they might be overthrown by rightwing forces 
in the military determined to pursue a more aggressive anti-guerrilla 
campaign. If this were to happen, they feel that the long-range prospects 
for a guerrilla victory against a reactionary military regime would be 
significantly increased. Termination of U.S. aid to El Salvador would also 
have injurious efforts throughout Latin America and especially in Central 
America, they argue, because moderate leaders cf countries presently facing 
Cuban-supported guerrilla insurgency would have reason to doubt the 
dependability of the United States support in time of need. 
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Congress could terminate aid either by a country-specific legislative 
prohibition, or somewhat more gradually by denying any further Administration 
funding r e q u e s ~ s  for El Salvador. Any such termination might lead to 2 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l - e x e c u t i v e ~ c o n t a t i o n t a t i o n ,  a veto of military aid legislation, 
 an^ a major override battle requiring a vote of two-thirds of both Houses. 
2. Increase Pressure on the Salvadoran Government by 
Tightening the Requirements of the kid Conditions 
Proponents of tightened conditions on U.S. aid to El Salvador feel that it 
is unrealistic to terminate aid to El Salvador, but argue that stronger 
accion must be taken hlith the Salvadoran government to avoid continuing U.S. 
support for a government whose actions strengthen guerrilla insurgency. This 
could be accomplished by adding new conditions for U.S. aid via the 
certification requirement. Central to this position is the assumption that 
greater U.S. pressure would be successful in promoting reforms and greater 
respect for human rights without provoking a right wing coup or an outright 
r e j e c ~ i o n  of U.S. assistance. Dissatisfied by what they regard as an overly 
loose interpretation by the Reagan Administration of the 
congressionally-mandated aid conditions, advocates of this approach would 
tighten the language of the conditions to require greater compliance with 
internationally respected human rights standards. Even a resulting 
suspension or reduction in U.S. aid, in this view, might serve to jolt the 
Salvadoran government into taking serious actions to improve human rights 
conditions. In the end, they argue, this would strengthen the government anC 
give it greater public support in the struggle with the guerrillas. 
Opponents of this approach emphasize that the Salvadoran government has 
made impressive progress under difficult circumstances. They argGe that mare 
demanding certification criteria might very well undermine the U.S.-supported 
moderate elements in the government and the military. They point out that 
Ambassador Hinton's highly critical speech in October 1982 provoked outrage 
from a number of'sectors and strengthened the view that U.S. aid should be 
rejected so long as it is accompanied by significant intervention in the 
Country's affairs. Convinced that the rate of progress is about as great as 
can be expected given the political complexity of the situation, they are 
fearful that the result of more rigorous certification criteria might be a 
termination of military assistance to El Salvador, which they believe, would 
polarize rather than strengthen moderation in the country, thereby improving 
the prospects of radical Marxist forces. 
3. Modify the Conditions To Require the Salvadoran Government 
to Negotiate with the FDR-FML,N 
Proponents of a political solution are convinced that El Salvador will 
face an unending guerrilla conflict in which neither the government nor the 
guerrillas are likely to be victorious unless negotiations are attempted. 
They would impose a congressionally mandated requirement that the Salvadoran 
government accept the offer made by the FDR-FMLN in October 1982 to engage in 
unconditional talks to resolve the conflict. If successful, this approach 
would strengthen the moderates in both camps and end the killing. Presumably 
it would result in an interim coalition government or in some form of 
internationally created and supervised interim government that would create 
the conditions for future elections fair and equitable by all parties. 
Proponents of this approach argue that nothing is to be lost by talks between 
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the twc parties. If the ieftist opposition demands an end to the killings 
and other abuses by the security forces, or if =he moderaze and rightist 
Farties insist upon the democratic process and conditions to guarantee 
private property, accommodation to these demands will only enhance the 
Sroadly-baseC consensus'that is necessary for long-term stability. 
Opponents OF negotiations argue that it would be a mistake to negotiate 
with violent Narxist-oriented groups that seek to gain a =  the bargaining 
tabie what they have been unable to win on the battlefield or in the March 
1982 elections. They argue that the Magana government is winning -- or at 
least holding its own in the war against the guerrillas with limited U.S. 
assistance, but that success is dependent on resolure opposition to -- not 
compromise with -- the guerrillas. They point to the Karch 1982 eleccions anC 
:h€ failure of the "final offensive" in 1981 as evidence chat the guerrilias 
Co not have the support of the population. They fear that the Marxist groups 
woulC emerge as the dominant force in any governing group brought about 
through negotiations, or would resume the war from a strengthened position, 
and point to Nicaragua under the Sandinistas as an example of the inevitable 
result. They also argue that American insistence on negotiations would 
constitute an extreme intervention in Salvadoran affairs. The chances for 
successful negotiation are also much slimmer in their view, than are the 
chances of provoking a rightwing coup or even a wider backlash. 
4. Strengthen the Congressional Role by Adding a Legislative 
Veto to the Conditions 
PrOpOnentS of this approach are convinced that the Congress should have an 
o'sp3rtUnity tc review the President's certifications as a way of * insuring 
that the executive will take forceful action to insist upon improved 
pe-rformance by the ~ a l v a d o r a n  government.  hey feel that ' the Reagan 
Administration places such importance on El Salvador that it will ccntinue to 
Certify Compliance with existing or more rigorous criteria regardless of the 
actual situation. Therefore, they argue, the Congress should have 30 days, 
for example, to approve or to disapprove the Presiaent's certification. In 
the event that the Congress disapproved the certification, the military aid 
and arms sales to El Salvador would have to cease. Proponents feel that the 
aid conditions will only be taken seriously when both the Administration and 
the Salvadoran government realize that the certification is subject to 
congressional veto. 
Opponents argue that a legislative veto would involve Congress 
- - 
.unnecessarily in the day-to-day complexities of Salvadoran politics. They 
point out that the initial proposal for congressionally required 'conditions 
on aid to El Salvador contained a legislative veto provision, but that it was 
deleted in committee because of inadequate support and because of President 
Reagan's threat to veto any legislation containing a legislative veto. The 
inclusion of a legislative veto would raise problems of the constitutional 
validity of such measures, especially after the June 1983 Supreme Court 
decision in INS vs. Chadha which held a one-house legislative veto to be 
UnCOnStitUtiOnal. Moreover, if Congress wishes to terminate aid on grounds 
related to the certification, opponents argue, it has more direct and less 
COnStitutiOnaliy Contentious means of doing so by reducing or prohibiting aid 
in the foreign aid authorization bills. 
Expand U.S. Aid and Support for the Salvadoran Government 
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Proponents of this view take the position that the United States should do 
everything within its ability to defend allies that are facing a g r o ~ i n g  
complex of Communist-inspired guerrilla insurgencies ti-,at threaten Central 
America. Maintaining that the Salvadoran government has the support of the 
people, demonstrated in the recent election, against externally-supplied 
guerrillas, they would favor an increase in U.S. aid and support for the 
Magana government to insure its survival and ultimate victory. Some would 
also support elimination of the certification requirement on the grounds that 
its conditions focus unnecessary criticism upon the government and provide 
propaganda ammunition for the guerrillas. As a variation on this theme, 
Senator Helms has proposed that the U.S. government be required to report on 
the hunan rights abuses by the guerrillas as well as by the government in 
Crder to provide a more balanced perspective on the situaticn. 
,lonal U.S. support would permit an increase in Other proponents of addic' 
the number of U..S. advisers in El Salvador, and would be willing to have them 
participate in combat operations if that were necessary to insure government 
success. 
Opponents of further U.S. military aid argue that the current emphasis on 
economic assistance is more likely than increases in military aid to promote 
the kinds o,f reforms that will undermine support for the guerrillas. Since 
greater U.S. military involvement could both strengthen the FMLN argument 
that they are fighting against American imperialism while undermining 
domestic American support for U.S. policy, opponents would closely limit the 
number of U.S. advisers and would continue to insist that these advisers 
renain out of com.bat areas. Opponents of a larger U.S. military advisory 
role stress the Vietnam precedent, arguing that in that case increased U.S. 
advisers failed to halt 2 crumbling political-military situation, discredited 
a weak government, and in the face of imminent defeat of the government, led 
to 'the fateful introduction of U.S. gr'ound forces. Some doubt that, short 
of heavy, direct U.S. combat intervention, the Salvadoran insurgency can be 
defeated by the inept current government. 
Congressional Action in 1983 
On the $60 million reprogramming of FY83 military aid 
While the Senate Appropriations Committee approved the $60 million 
reprogramming with conditions, subsequent action by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the House Appropriations Committee permitted the 
Administration to reprogram only $30 million of the requested amount. 
The Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
approved on Mar. 23, 1983 by a vote of 7-2 the $60 million reprogramming on 
the condition that the number of U.S. advisers be limited to 55, that new 
efforts be made to improve the Salvadoran judicial system, and that the 
administration take the initiative to bring about unconditional discussions 
between the Salvadoran government and its adversaries. 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after lengthy negotiations to 
arrive at a consensus position, approved only $30 million of the 
reprogramming on Mar. 24, 1983. While the letter to Secretary of State 
Shultz did not explicitly place conditions on the aid, the Committee 
expressed its belief that "the United States should use its good offices to 
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encourage an unconditional dialogue amonq all parties. to the conflict in Ei 
Salvador in the hope of achieving a political resolution," that U.S. nilitary 
advisers should be limited ro 5 5 ,  that any rraining of the Salvadoran 
military should be conducted in the Ucited States, and that far-reaching 
reforms of the Salvadoran judicial system were necessary for Continued ,U.S. 
support. 
The House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Foreign Operations 
voted 7 to 5 on Apr. 26, 1963, to approve $30 million of the proposed $60 
million reprogramming on the condition that the administration appoint a 
special envoy to facilitate negotiations in the Central. American region. 
On tne request for $50 m l l l ~ o n  in FY63 supplemental nllicary assistance 
The Conference compromise on the FY83 Supplemenzal Appropriations Bill 
(H.R. 3069) Which was passed and became law (P.L. 98-63)'in late ,July 1983 
split the difference between the House and Senate and provided $25 million in 
military aid appropriations for El Salvador. The Senate, following the 
recommendation of the Senate Appropriations Committee, had approved the full 
amount of $50 million, while the House bill, following action by the Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to defer action 
on military aid ro El Salvador, contained no funds for EL Salvador. 
If committee-recommended bills to authorize the supplemental military aid 
were to be passed, the available fun3s would be st" ,111 less than the 
appropriated amount mentioned above. The House Foreign Affairs Comrr~ittee had 
approved only $8.7 million of the requested amount (H-Rept. 98-192 on H.R. 
2992) while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved $20 million 
('S-~ept. 98-146 on S. 1347) with certain conditions. Language in P.'L.. 98-63 
provides that funds for foreign assistance may not .be oSligated until the 
enactment of authorizinq legislation or until Sept. 15, 1983, whichever comes 
first. 
On economic and military aid for FY64 
While no final action was taken by either House on foreign aid 
authorizations for FY84, the foreign affairs committees generally approved 
the Administration's r e q u e s ~  for developmental assistance and for Economic 
Support Funds for El Salvador, but approved less than the $86.3 miilion in 
military aid which the Administration requested for the country. 1n 
addition, the committees attached even tighter conditions on the aid than 
previously existed. The House Foreign Affairs Committee in its report 
(H-Rept. 98-192 on H.R. 2992) limited military aid to $05 million for FY84 
and FY85, of which $15 million could be used only for medical facilities and 
supplies. After limiting the number of U.S. advisers to 55 and precluding 
the President's use of special emergency powers aid to El Salvador, the 
Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision of aid to El 
Salvador only if the'president reported, without congressional disapproval, 
that Salvadoran Government was engaged in good faith in a dialogue without 
preconditions with all major parties .to the conflict, and was acting to carry 
out its own program to improve conditions in the country. 
The Senate Foreign,Relations Committee in its report (S.Rept. 98-146 on 
S. 1347) recommended a limit of $76.3 million in military aid to El Salvador, 
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$20 million of which is to be usee solely for training Salvadoran troops in 
the United Stares. The Committee limited the number of U.S. advisers in El 
Salvador to 5 5  and exteneed the present requirement for semi-annual 
Certifications by the President on Salvadoran Government efforts to improve 
human rights conditions'in the country. 
Lacking a foreign aid authorization measure, assistance to El Salvador was 
set by an omnibus Continuing Resolution (F.L. 98-151, H.J.Res. 413) which vas 
passed by Congress on Nov. 12 anC signed by the President on Nov. 14, 1983. 
This measure provided that not more than $64.8 million in military assistance 
may be provided to El Salvador. it further provided that not more than 70% 
of military aid may be expended until Salvadoran authorities have brought the 
accused to trial in xhe case of the U.S. nuns murdered in December 1960, and 
that noc more than 93% of this aid may be expended uncil President certifies 
that the Salvadoran government is continuing to make progress in implementing 
the land reform progrart decreed in ):arch and April 1980. 
The Congress also passed a bill (H.R. 4042) to continue through FY84 the 
1981 Conditions requiring the President to certify semi-annualiy that the 
Salvadoran government was improving human rights conditions and was 
continuing major political and economic reforms. This measure was killed by 
a pocket veto on Nov. 30, 1983, when President Reagan failed to sign the bill 
in the required time.. 
LEGISLATION 
P.L. 98-63, H.R. 3'069 
This omnibus measure providing supplemental appropriations for FY83 
includes $25 million in military aid for El Salvador, exactly half of the $50 
million in supplementary funds for .El Salvador which the Administration 
reqaested in Karch 1983. Following the recommendation by the Foreign 
Operations Subcommittee and the full House Appropriations Committee to defer 
action on the President's request for supplemental military aid to Z1 
Salvador (H.Rept.' 98-207), the bill passed by the House May 25, 1963, 
contained no funds for El Salvador. The bill passed by the Senate June 16, 
1983, on the other hand, followed the recommendation of che Senate 
Appropriations Committee (S.Rept. 98-148) in approving the full request for 
$50 million. The compromise conference report (H-Rept. 98-308), filed July 
20, 1983, noted the conferees agreement "that not more than $25,000,000 shall 
be available for El Salvador." Following the resolution of differences on 
other issues, the House and Senate passed the bill July 29, 1983, and the 
President signed the measure into law July 30, 1983. 
P.L. 98-53, H.R. 1271 
Amends Section 728(e) of the ,International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1981 (the conditions on aid to El Salvador which contain a 
one-time requirement of demonstrated progress in the cases of murdered 
American citizens) to require that the fourth certification may be made only 
if the President determines that since the third certification the Salvadoran 
Government (1) has made good faith efforts to investigate and bring to 
justice all those responsible for the murders of the U.S. nuns and labor 
advisers in December 1980 and J.anuary 1981, (2) has taken all reasonable 
steps to investigate the January 1981 disappearance of journalist John 
Sullivan, and (3) has taken all reasonable steps to investigate the kil-ling 
of Kichael Kline in October 1982. Congress attached similar provisions to 
the 2nd and 3rd certifications. With broad support, the measure was passed 
in the House 416-2 on June 7, 1983, and was passed in the Senate on June 29, 
1983. It became law with the President's signature on July 15, 1983. 
P.L. 95-151 (E.J.Res. 413) 
This omnibus Continuing Resoiution Raking further continuing 
appropriations for FY84 provides in part thac not more than $64.8  illio ion in 
military assistance may be provided to El Salvador. It further provides that 
noc more than 70% of this military aid may be expended until Salvadoran 
authorities have brought the accused to trail in the case of the U.S. nuns 
murdered in December 1980, and that not more than 90% of this aid may be 
expended until the President determines and certifies that the Salvadoran 
government has continued to make documented prograss in implementing the land 
reform program decreed in Garch and April 1980. Introduced in the House Nov. 
10, both houses passed differing versions of =he bill that Cay. Conference 
report agreed to Nov. 12; signed into law (P.L. 96-151) Nov. 14, 1983. 
H.R. 4042 (Barnes) 
Continues in effect the 1981 certification requirements on human rights 
in El Salvador until Congress enacts new legislation on the subject or until 
Sept. 30, 1984, whichever occurs furst. Called up by committee discharge, 
the bill passed the House Sept. 30, and passed the Senate Nov. 17, 1983. 
President Reagan pocket-vetoed the measure 'Nov. 30, 1983, wher, he failed to 
sign the bill within the required time. 
X.R. 2992 (Zablocki) 
International Seccrity and Development Cooperation Act of 1983. This is 
a clean bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Kay 17, 1983 
(H-Rept. 98-192) after :he Committee completed markup on Kay 12, 1983. With 
regard to El Salvador, it authorizes $8.7 million of the $50 million 
requested in the FY83 supplemental, and it authorizes $65 million in military 
assistance (rather than the requested amount of $86.3 million) anC $120 
million i n  Economic Support Funds for ~ ~ ' 8 4  and FY85. After limiting the 
number of U.S. ~ i l i t a r y  advisers to 55, and precluding the President's use of 
special emergency powers to provide aid to El Salvador, the 
Committee-recommended conditions would permit the provision of aid to El 
Salvador only if the Salvadoran Government is engaged in good faith in a 
dialogue without preconditions with all major parties to the conflict, and is 
acting to carry out its own plans to improve conditions in the country. Half 
of the FY84 aid and all of the FY85 aid would be contingent upon Presidential 
progress reports due 6 and 11 months after the start of the fiscal year. 
S. 1347 (Percy) 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1983. This is 
a clean bill reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May -23, 
1983 (S.Rept. 98-146), after the Committee completed markup on Kay 12, 1983. 
With regard to El Salvador, it authorizes $76.3 million in military 
assistance for El Salvador for FY83. and FY84, which has the effect of 
authorizing $20 miliion of the requested $50 million supplemental in FY83. 
It places a limit of 55 on the number of military advisers in El Salvador, 
and it provides that $20 million of the military assistance may be used only 
for training in the United States. In ,addition, the Committee extended the 
present requirement for semi-annual certifications of compliance with certain 
conditions in El Salvador in order to continue providing assistance to the 
country. It also added requirements for reports on government efforts to 
improve the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, and to eliminate 
and control right-wing death squads, and on terrorist activities by the 
guerrillas. 
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out this o ~ i g i n a l  bill on 
Sept. 27, i983, with provisions that essentially approved the 
ad mini strati or,'^ request For $86.3 milliori in military aid for El Salvador. 
It provided in Section 531, however, that 30% of all FY84 aid to ~ h e  country 
may not be expended unt,il Salvadoran authorities have brought those accused 
in the case of the four murdered American nuns to trial and have obtained a 
verdict. 
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CERONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
11/30/83 -- President Reagan pocket vetoed a bill to continue through 
FY84 the certification requirement linking continued 
U.S. military aid to progress in human rights performance 
in El Salvador'when he failed to sign the bill within the 
required time limit. 
1lj25/83 - -  U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, in a speech to the American 
Chamber of Commerce in San Salvador, accused Salvadoran 
authorities of failing to crack down on right-wing death 
squads, even though individuals responsible for the killings 
a r e  "well knownw to the security forces. 
11/18/83 -- The New York Times reported claims by local residents that 
Salvadoran Army troops rounded u p  and killed more than 1 0 0  
suspected leftist sympathizers, including women and 
children, in three small towns in northern El Salvador. 
11/13/63 -- Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle, just back from a 
trip to El Salvador where he reportedly expressed U.S. 
concerns about rightwing death squads, was reported in the 
Washington Post t o  be urging increased U.S. military 
assistance to revive the Salvadoran Army's struggle with 
leftist guerrillas. 
11/12/83 -- The State Department i n . a  prepared statement indicated that 
the student arrested for the murder of U.S. military adviser 
Commander Albert A. Schaufelberger "was not involved in the 
crime" and that "his confession was obEaFned under duress." 
11/09/63 -- Salvadoran authorities arrested three policemen and a small 
landowner and charged them with kidnapping in a pattern 
'similar to recent death squad activity. 
11/05/83 - -  The Washington Post reported that the Reagan Administration 
hopes to set up a large military training center in eastern 
El Salvador where U.S. intructors will give basic training 
to 1,000 Salvadcran recruits each month. 
10/2€?/63 -- Judge Bernando Rauda Murcia ordered five National Guardsmen 
to trial for the second time for the 1980 murders of four 
American churchwomen following a reinvestigatior, ordered by 
a Salvadoran appeals court. 
10/05/63 -- The five countries of Cenzral America, in a 
meeting organized by the Contadora group, 
agreed upon a declaration that outlines issues 
for future negotiation. 
10/03/63 -- The State Department condemned increase right-wing 
violence, claiming that it undermines centrist 
support necessary for democratic .development in 
El Salvador. 
09/33/83 -- The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 
unamimously to extend for one year conditions on 
'military ,aid to El Salvador which expire at the 
end of fiscal year 1983. 
~ 9 / 2 9 / 6 3  -- Salvadoran government officials met wi.th lefti'st 
rebel leaders for the second time in talks. After 
the meeting, Francisco Quinonez, the head of the 
government Peace Commission said that further 
progress would not be made unless the left changed 
its position. 
09/26/83 -- Salvadoran military bombing runs in Tenancingo, 
21 miles northeast of San Salvador, killed 50 
civilians and wounded 25 after rebels interfered 
with th'e radio signals to confuse Air Force Pilots. 
Salvadoran Colonel Monterrosa publically regretted 
the bombings. 
09/24/83 -- The New York Times reported that Salvadoran 
leftists and diplomats have said that the rebel 
movement has gained in internal unity in the 
last few months. They attribute this largely to 
an agreement by the Popular Liberation Forces, 
the second-largest Salvadoran guerilla group, 
to submit itself to a centralized military command. 
09/09/83 -- Associated Press reporter Arthur Allen left El 
Salvador after the American embassy s a i d i t  could no 
longer assure his safety. The Chief of Intelligence 
of the Treasury Police had earlier criticized two 
of &.ller.Is articles ~ o ~ c e r n i n g  the Salvadoran Security 
Force's arrest of a suspect in the murder-of Lt. 
Commander Albert Shaufelberger. 
03/C7/83 -- Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger visiting the 
Salvadorar. Front Lines said the army is "making 
very great progress," but that Congress's reluctance 
to authorize more aid could jeopardize further 
progress. 
09/05/83 - -  R e f e r r ~ n g  to che recent meetlng held between 
government o f i i c ~ a l s  ant t h e ~ r  g u e r ~ l i a  opponects 
RicnarC Stcne, Specla1 Envoy to Central k m e r ~ c a ,  
sald that the Salvadoran government w ~ l l  not accept 
azy plan to snare power w ~ t h  the guerillas f l g h t ~ n g  ~ t .  
09/04/83 -- Rebel forces attacked the third largest El Salvadoran 
city of San Miguel with the strongest mortar barrage 
they have yet fired in the current conflict. The 
attack was the guerillasf first major show of force 
since February. 
C9/~1/83 -- Pedro D. Alvarado Rivera, a Popular Liberation Front 
(FPL) guerilla arrested on August 25, reportedly 
claimed responsibility for the murder of U.S. 
military advisor, Navy it. Commander Albert 
Schaufelberger 1 1 1 ,  who was killed on Kay 25. 
08/30/83 -- U.S. Special Envoy to Central America, Richard Stone, 
met with 'the representatives of the Salvadoran a 
guerilla movement. Talks were inconclusive; only 
promises of further communications were made. The 
Washington Post reported that senior officials on 
both sides see major barriers to a negotiated settlement. 
08/29/83 -- In Bogota, Columbia, representatives of the 
Salvadoran government's Peace Commission met with 
left wing opposition leaders for the first time in 
attempts to negotiate a settlement of the three-year 
old conflict. 
06/24/63 - -  The latest class of Salvadoran governmenr troops 
trained by the United States military graduated from 
Fort Benning in Georgia. 
08/23/83 -- Italian citizen Vittorio Andretto was killed b y  
Salvadoran troops who said he was shot after the 
pickup truck he was riding in ran through a military 
checkpoint. 
08/1S/E3 -- President Reagan announced that he will not increase 
the number of U.S. rniiitary trainers in El Salvador 
beyond the presently existing limit of 55. This 
decision came a few days after the Pentagon and the 
State Department reversed their original requests 
for an increase cf advisors to 125. 
08/16/83 -- The El Salvador,an army and the Guatemalan government 
have denied reports by the Kew Pork Times of August ;4. 
"These reports said tnat the two countries had agreed 
tnat members of El Salvador's 24,000 U.S.-backed 
army wouid.receive :raining from Guatemalan counter 
insurgency experts at bases in Guatemala'. In return, 
-the reports said, Guatemala would be providee with 
light weapons and ammunition from El Sal.vador1s U.S. 
supplied arsenal. 
08/15/13 --  The amnesty program for political prisoners which began 
Kay 4 came to an end; 1,116 people were granted amnesty 
urider ~ t .  
08/14/83 -- The Los Angeles Times reported chat U.S. advisors in 
El Salvador are increasingly involved in training 
excersises which are potentially dangerous. 
08/11/83 -- The Washington Post reported that twice as many 
Salvadoran soldiers were killed in combat this year 
than were in 1982. Also, the casualty count this 
year totaled about one-fifth of El Salvador's 33,000 
man military. 
08/06/83 -- As a demonstration of President Reagan's economic 
support for El Salvador, Agriculture Secretary 
John Block said the country will receive more than 
$58 million in new U.S. food aid reported the 
Washington Post. 
For chronology of 1982 events, request "1982 Chronology" from archived fssue 
Srief 80064. For chro.nology prior to 1982, request CRS Report entitled "El 
Salvador -- From 1931 to the March 1982 Elections." 
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